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Horn v. Banks
122 S. Ct. 2147 (2002)
L Fads
In Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, on September 25, 1982, George Banks
("Banks") shot and killed thirteen people. Banks began by killing three of his
girlfriends and their five children inside his home. When he left his home, a
group of bystanders had gathered outside the house. Banks shot and killed one
bystander and wounded a second before carjacking a nearbycar. He then drove
to a trailer park and shot another one of his girlfriends, his girlfriend's mother,
and his son. A state court jury convicted Banks of twelve counts of first degree
murder and one count of third degree murder.'
During the penaltyphase, the judge instructed the jurythat to impose death
it must find unanimously either the presence of one aggravating circumstance
and no mitigating circumstances or, alternatively, one or more aggravating
circumstances which outweighed any mitigating evidence. The verdict form
required the juryto check one of two boxes that presented the same two choices
in essentiallythe same language. The jury marked the form indicating that it had
found an aggravating circumstance and a mitigating circumstance, but that the
mitigating circumstance did not outweigh the aggravator. The jury sentenced
Banks to death on each of the twelve counts of first-degree murder.2
The defendant's direct appeal was denied.3 Afterwards, the United States
Supreme Court decided Mis v Mar244 the defendant used MiEls in his state
post-conviction proceedings to challenge the jury instructions and verdict form
given at his r~ The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected the defendant's
Mih claim, as did the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Neither court based its rejection on the argument that Mi//s should
not be applied retroactively, but rather rejected defendant's petition on the
merits. The defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
1. Banks v. Horn, 271 F.3d 527,531 (3rd CAr. 2001).
2. Hom v. Banks, 122 S. O. 2147,2148-49 (2002) ("Banes").
3. Id at 2149.
4. 486 US. 367 (1988).
5. Banks, 122 S. . at 2149; swMlls v. Maryanl, 486 US. 367,384 (1988) (vacating death
sentence because trial court's jury instructions and the verdict form could have been interpreted by
the jury to require that all twelve jurors agree on a mitigating circumstance prior to weighing themitigator against the aggravating circumstances).
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Third Crcuit and the decision was reversed. The Commonwealth then appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.6
I Hddbg
The United States Supreme Court held that the Third Circuit committed
plain error when it failed to analyze Banks's argument under the rule of Teagx u
Lane.' It further held that whenever the State makes a Teage argument, retroac-
tivity becomes a threshold question that the federal courts must address.'
M. A ndis
The Court in M/s held that "the Constitution prohibits a state from requir-
ing jurors unanimously to agree that a particular mitigating circumstance exists
before they are permitted to consider that circumstance in their sentencing
determination."9 Banks asserted that the jury instructions and the verdict form
used in his trial created a reasonable possibility that the jury believed that it was
required to agree "unanimously" on a mitigator before it could consider that
mitigator in the sentencing determination."' The Commonwealth argued that the
M/s rule was handed down after the defendant's final judgment; therefore,
retroactive application of Mils was barred under Tague." The lower courts did
not consider the retroactivity issue because they did not find that the Mils
argument met the AEDPA standard of review.' The Third Circuit found that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied Mi/s unreasonably and reversed the
death sentence; it did not conduct a Tage analysis because Texgie had not been
a part of the lower court's decision."
The United States Supreme Court relied on its decision in Gas/i v Bdient
to find that the Third Circuit had erred in not performing a Taigue analysis.5
CGs i held that in every habeas case that involves a new rule, it is a threshold
question whether Tgiebars the new rule from retroactive application. 6 OCas i
6. Baxas, 122 S. CL at 2149-50.
7. Id at 2148; see Teague v. Lane, 489 US. 288, 289 (1989) (holding that new rules of
constitutional criminal prcedure do not apply to defendants who have received final judgments,
unless the rule falls whtwo narrow exceptions).
8. Bxms, 122 S. Q. at 2148.
9. Id at 2149 (citing Milk, 486 US. at 374).
10. Id at 2150-51.
11. Id at 2151.
12. Id at2149; se28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to a state court decision can only be granted if the state court's decision was contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of cleadyestablished federal hw, part of the Anti Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996).
13. Brks, at 2149.
14. 510 US. 383 (1994).
15. Bas, 122 S. 0L at 2150 (citing Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 US. 383, 389 (1994)).
16. Id at 2150;,seCTi, 5 10 US. at 389 (holding Taogwis athreshold questionif raised in
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clarified that a federal court need not perform a Tagwe analysis if the State fails
to raise the issue; if the State does raise the issue, however, the court must
analyze retroactivity before addressing the merits of the claim. " The Court held
that because the State did raise Trgie, the federal court was obligated to apply
Tze to Midls and that this threshold analysis was a separate requirement from
any analysis required under AEDPA "
IV. Appiaw in Vbgia
A. Trial
Pennsylvania's capital sentencing statute textuallymp m a finding of death
if the jury finds an aggravator without finding any mitigators, or if the jury finds
an aggravator that is not outweighed sufficiently by any mitigation.19 The jury
must impose a life sentence in all other instances." Virginia's sentencing statute
is different from Pennsylvania's on two levels. Virginia does not require a
specific "weighing" of the mitigators and the aggravators, and Virginia never
requires a juryto return a finding of death. 1 Because of this statutorydifference,
the exact circumstances that occurred in Horn will not arise in Virginia. Never-
theless, a jury instruction or a verdict form given in Virginia could generate
confusion amongst the jurors as to the role of the mitigators in sentencing. If,
for example, the defense did not put forth any mitigating evidence and the jury
found at least one of the statutory aggravators, the jury may believe that it must
impose a sentence of death. Similarly, if the jury agrees upon an aggravator, but
does not agree on a particular mitigator, it maystill think it is obligated to impose
a sentence of death. Mills provides that the jury may not be led to believe that
it must agree unanimously on a mitigator in order to consider mitigation in its
a federal habeas case).
17. Bans, 122 S. G. at 2150, sw Capx? 510 US. at 389 (concluding that if the State does
not raise a Tasw argument, the court does not have to perform a retroactivity inquiry).
18. Bwnes, 122 S. . at 2150-51.
19. Se42 PA. COi'. STAT. ANN. S 9711(c)(rv) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that "the verdict
must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance.
and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unan iusly finds one or more aggravating
circumstances which outweigh anymitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of lifeimpronment in all other cases").
20. Id
21. SegmIly VA. CODE ANN. S 19.-264.2 (lfichie 2000) (stating that a jury may impose
a sentence of death if it finds one of two aggravators and has considered any mitigating evidence).
The Virginia statute never states that the jury must or shall impose a sentence of death if it reaches
certain conclusions. Nevertheless, the statute does not underscore this point with direct language
stating that the jurymayalways inpose a life sentence, regardless of its findings. The most effective




final decision.22 Capital defenders should be alert to instructions or verdict forms
which might confuse the jury in violation of Mils.
B. Federd Haiais
The Court's holding that Teugue is a threshold question is applicable in
Virginia capital cases in federal habeas proceedings. On a practical level, the
Court has put the Commonwealth on notice to raise the TagpV issue in the
federal district court. Defense attorneys need to be prepared to present a Tugu
argument for any new rule of constitutional criminal procedure they may want
to invoke retroactively' In cases, however, in which the Comnionwealth does
not raise Tugu, the federal courts still maintain discretion over whether to
conduct a Tasgie inquiry into the application of a new ule. 4 The Court in-
structed that a Tzge inquiryis to be conducted before addressing AEDPA and
that Tagwe conclusions are separate and distinct from AEDPA.2
Finally, the Fourth Circuit has previously held that Milk is retroactive.26
Thus, in federal habeas proceedings involving a Mi&/s issue, the initial The
question has already been answered favorably for the defense. The remaining
question for the habeas court to review will be if the lower court complied with
AEDPA in its application of Mils.
V. Cba icn
The confusing jury instructions and verdict form used in Hm could occur
in Virginia, but are prohibited byMils v Marlari Unlike Horn, a defendant in
Virginia would not have to argue for retroactive application of MiLls because the
Fourth Ciruit has already authorized its retroactive applicability. Horn clarified
that before applying new rules which have not undergone a Teague analysis,
federal courts must conduct a Trgue inquiry if the State raises the issue; courts
are not obligated to conduct an inquiry if the State does not raise a Tazgue argu-
=ent. Virginia attorneys can relyon Homto argue that Tazgue v Lam is a thresh-
old question and that the results of a Taugw inquiry cannot be ignored by using
the language of AEDPA.
Janice L. Kopec
22. Mils, 486 US. at 384.
23. See Taeq 489 US. at 311 (holding that there are two types of newrules of constitutional
criminal procedure that can be applied retroactively- rules that place "certain kinds of prima y
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,"
or "watershed rules of criminal procedure").
24. Baks, 122 S. Ca. at 2150, see Gua , 510 Us. at 389.
25. anm, 122S. C. at2151. SeesmdiyJanice L Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 197
(2002) (analyzing Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190, 193 (4th CAr. 2002)).
26. Bank, 122 S. C. at 2150 n.4 (citing Wiliams v. Dixon, 961 F2d 448,443,456 (4th Cr.
1992) (holding that Mi/! is a new rule that can be applied retroactively under Taxd's second
exception because it affects "bedrockproceduralelements" which are "implicit in ordered liberty")).
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